Information Bulletin of the BRICS Trade Union Forum
Monitoring of the economic, social and labor situation in the BRICS countries
Monitoring of the economic, social and labor situation in the BRICS countries
Issue 3.2026
2025.01.12 — 2026.01.18
International relations
Foreign policy in the context of BRICS
Iran exposes the limits of BRICS unity (Иран обнажил пределы единства стран БРИКС) / United Kingdom, January, 2026
Keywords: political_issues, expert_opinion
2026-01-14
2026-01-14
United Kingdom
Source: www.middleeastmonitor.com
What is unfolding in Iran today is not merely another chapter in a long story of unrest. It is a stress test for the global order, for the credibility of emerging powers, and for the moral grammar of international diplomacy at a moment when multipolarity is no longer theoretical but painfully real.
Since late December 2025, Iran has been gripped by nationwide protests triggered by an economic freefall. The numbers alone are staggering. The rial collapsed to around 1.42 million to the US dollar. Inflation surged beyond 40 per cent. Basic commodities vanished from shelves. What began with strikes by shopkeepers in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar rapidly spread across all 31 provinces, morphing from economic anger into unmistakably political defiance. Chants no longer pleaded for relief but demanded an end to clerical rule. By mid-January 2026, human rights organisations and AP confirmed that at least 2000 civilians, including children, had been killed by security forces. Internet access was cut nationwide, a familiar signal of a state bracing for survival.
These protests are smaller than the 2022–23 ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ uprising, yet they may prove more destabilising. The reason lies in the economy. Iran’s unrest is now anchored in material despair rather than symbolic outrage. Power shortages, fuel price hikes, and the removal of subsidised exchange rates have hollowed out daily life. According to the Atlantic Council, Iran’s GDP growth lags far behind that of every other BRICS member, while inflation is the highest in the bloc. This is not the profile of a rising power. It is the anatomy of exhaustion.
And yet, this exhausted state now sits inside BRICS.
Iran’s accession in 2024 was celebrated in grand language about multipolarity and Global South solidarity. In reality, it was contentious from the outset. Reuters reported that India resisted admitting states under UN sanctions, while Brazil and South Africa worried about antagonising Western partners. Only China and Russia pushed unequivocally, seeing Iran as a strategic counterweight to US influence. That gamble now confronts reality.
BRICS is being forced to absorb not just Iran’s economy, but its internal crisis. This matters because BRICS has marketed itself as a more just alternative to Western-led governance, one grounded in development, dignity, and sovereignty. Silence in the face of lethal crackdowns risks hollowing out that claim. Loud condemnation risks fracturing the bloc. The dilemma is structural.
China’s response has been telling. Beijing has urged ‘peace and stability’ while opposing any external intervention, a formulation that prioritises order above accountability. Russia has echoed sovereignty and condemned Western ‘meddling’, consistent with its own experiences of internal dissent. India, Brazil and South Africa have opted for studied restraint, calling for calm without addressing the gunfire. The divergence underscores a truth often obscured by BRICS communiqués: this is not a values-based coalition but a balancing act among incompatible political systems.
This isn’t just a regional flare-up — it should set off alarm bells from Canberra to Cape Town and Beijing to Brasília. It puts the world in a cruel light: brute power and paranoid geopolitics on one side, the fragile moral and legal rules that hold states to account on the other. Iran’s government insists the unrest is foreign-instigated. The narrative of siege is familiar and emotionally potent, especially in a country shaped by the 1953 foreign intelligence-backed coup and decades of sanctions. Yet international law is not silent on the use of lethal force against peaceful demonstrators. Iran is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented violations that cut directly against those obligations.
Here lies the deeper fracture. The post–Cold War order promised that economic integration and multilateral institutions would gradually align power with norms. The present moment suggests the opposite. Sanctions have crippled Iran’s economy without moderating its politics. Membership in a rising bloc has provided diplomatic cover without delivering stability at home. The result is a population squeezed between inflation and batons, while great powers argue about non-interference.
History offers uncomfortable parallels. The 1979 Iranian Revolution showed how quickly legitimacy can evaporate once bazaars turn against the state. The Arab Spring revealed how economic grievances mutate into existential challenges. Yet Iran is not Egypt or Tunisia. It is militarised, regionally embedded, and strategically shielded by Moscow and Beijing. Any external intervention would risk regional conflagration and oil market shock. Even rumours of escalation send prices upward, a reminder that Iran’s domestic crisis has global consequences.
The strategic implications are already visible. Iran’s security forces are stretched between internal repression and external deterrence. The so-called Axis of Resistance is weaker than at any point in the past decade. Hezbollah is constrained, Syria is fragile, and Tehran’s room for manoeuvre is narrowing. A miscalculation — an Israeli strike, an American threat, a proxy clash — could ignite escalation precisely when the regime is most brittle.
What, then, is left? The answer is unsatisfying but necessary: disciplined diplomacy anchored in realism, not illusions. Regime change from outside would be catastrophic. Indifference to bloodshed corrodes legitimacy. Targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for violence, combined with humanitarian and economic channels that bypass the state, remain among the few tools available. Forums such as the UN and BRICS itself should not be stages for platitudes but venues for quiet pressure and accountability.
US President Donald Trump declared that “help is on its way” to Iranian protesters and cancelled meetings with Tehran, warning of strong retaliation, a stance that has energised solidarity demonstrations outside US embassies from Sydney to London, even though Washington has not specified what form that assistance will take. In contrast, BRICS partners have refrained from directly commenting on Iran’s internal crackdown, focusing instead on diplomatic settlement and multilateral engagement, such as reaffirming peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and upholding international law in summit communiqués without endorsing intervention.
This is the moment that will define BRICS: a moral stress test for an expanded multipolar order. Not a slogan, not a communiqué, but a live question of whether sovereignty can still coexist with human dignity when power is finally dispersed. Iran’s crisis is forcing that reckoning into the open. Accountability should land exactly where responsibility sits — on the command nodes that authorised unlawful force. Travel bans, asset freezes, and a short, independent forensic review would draw a clear line between consequence and collective punishment.
The message would be unmistakable: repression carries a price, but civilians are not collateral.
At the same time, relief must move faster than rhetoric. Food, fuel, cash, and connectivity cannot be held hostage to politics. Neutral humanitarian bypass channels, facilitated through the ICRC or UN mechanisms, reinforced by BRICS-backed escrow and swap arrangements, can deliver lifelines directly to households while sidestepping state rent-seeking. This is not generosity. It is strategic compassion, stabilising lives before despair hardens into collapse.
Finally, pressure must be quiet but relentless. Not megaphone diplomacy, but disciplined engagement. Discreet envoys, paired with a light-touch BRICS–UN monitoring cell, could track verified indicators and offer private guidance calibrated to change behaviour without detonating the system. The goal is not humiliation or regime change. It is restraint, stability, and credibility for Iran, and for the bloc that now claims it.
Handled well, this becomes proof that multipolarity can mature. Handled badly, it confirms the darkest fear: that power has multiplied, but responsibility has not.
Iran’s crisis exposes the unfinished business of multipolarity. Power has diversified; norms have not. BRICS can either become a shield for repression or a laboratory for responsible sovereignty. The choice will shape how the Global South is perceived — not as an abstract constituency, but as a moral actor in world politics.
For Iran’s citizens, the stakes are painfully immediate: dignity, bread, and the right to speak without being shot. For the international system, the stakes are structural. If emerging powers cannot reconcile stability with humanity, the promise of a fairer order will ring hollow. This is not merely Iran’s reckoning. It is a reckoning for a world learning, once again, that economics, legitimacy, and power cannot be separated without consequence.
Source: www.middleeastmonitor.com
What is unfolding in Iran today is not merely another chapter in a long story of unrest. It is a stress test for the global order, for the credibility of emerging powers, and for the moral grammar of international diplomacy at a moment when multipolarity is no longer theoretical but painfully real.
Since late December 2025, Iran has been gripped by nationwide protests triggered by an economic freefall. The numbers alone are staggering. The rial collapsed to around 1.42 million to the US dollar. Inflation surged beyond 40 per cent. Basic commodities vanished from shelves. What began with strikes by shopkeepers in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar rapidly spread across all 31 provinces, morphing from economic anger into unmistakably political defiance. Chants no longer pleaded for relief but demanded an end to clerical rule. By mid-January 2026, human rights organisations and AP confirmed that at least 2000 civilians, including children, had been killed by security forces. Internet access was cut nationwide, a familiar signal of a state bracing for survival.
These protests are smaller than the 2022–23 ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ uprising, yet they may prove more destabilising. The reason lies in the economy. Iran’s unrest is now anchored in material despair rather than symbolic outrage. Power shortages, fuel price hikes, and the removal of subsidised exchange rates have hollowed out daily life. According to the Atlantic Council, Iran’s GDP growth lags far behind that of every other BRICS member, while inflation is the highest in the bloc. This is not the profile of a rising power. It is the anatomy of exhaustion.
And yet, this exhausted state now sits inside BRICS.
Iran’s accession in 2024 was celebrated in grand language about multipolarity and Global South solidarity. In reality, it was contentious from the outset. Reuters reported that India resisted admitting states under UN sanctions, while Brazil and South Africa worried about antagonising Western partners. Only China and Russia pushed unequivocally, seeing Iran as a strategic counterweight to US influence. That gamble now confronts reality.
BRICS is being forced to absorb not just Iran’s economy, but its internal crisis. This matters because BRICS has marketed itself as a more just alternative to Western-led governance, one grounded in development, dignity, and sovereignty. Silence in the face of lethal crackdowns risks hollowing out that claim. Loud condemnation risks fracturing the bloc. The dilemma is structural.
China’s response has been telling. Beijing has urged ‘peace and stability’ while opposing any external intervention, a formulation that prioritises order above accountability. Russia has echoed sovereignty and condemned Western ‘meddling’, consistent with its own experiences of internal dissent. India, Brazil and South Africa have opted for studied restraint, calling for calm without addressing the gunfire. The divergence underscores a truth often obscured by BRICS communiqués: this is not a values-based coalition but a balancing act among incompatible political systems.
This isn’t just a regional flare-up — it should set off alarm bells from Canberra to Cape Town and Beijing to Brasília. It puts the world in a cruel light: brute power and paranoid geopolitics on one side, the fragile moral and legal rules that hold states to account on the other. Iran’s government insists the unrest is foreign-instigated. The narrative of siege is familiar and emotionally potent, especially in a country shaped by the 1953 foreign intelligence-backed coup and decades of sanctions. Yet international law is not silent on the use of lethal force against peaceful demonstrators. Iran is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented violations that cut directly against those obligations.
Here lies the deeper fracture. The post–Cold War order promised that economic integration and multilateral institutions would gradually align power with norms. The present moment suggests the opposite. Sanctions have crippled Iran’s economy without moderating its politics. Membership in a rising bloc has provided diplomatic cover without delivering stability at home. The result is a population squeezed between inflation and batons, while great powers argue about non-interference.
History offers uncomfortable parallels. The 1979 Iranian Revolution showed how quickly legitimacy can evaporate once bazaars turn against the state. The Arab Spring revealed how economic grievances mutate into existential challenges. Yet Iran is not Egypt or Tunisia. It is militarised, regionally embedded, and strategically shielded by Moscow and Beijing. Any external intervention would risk regional conflagration and oil market shock. Even rumours of escalation send prices upward, a reminder that Iran’s domestic crisis has global consequences.
The strategic implications are already visible. Iran’s security forces are stretched between internal repression and external deterrence. The so-called Axis of Resistance is weaker than at any point in the past decade. Hezbollah is constrained, Syria is fragile, and Tehran’s room for manoeuvre is narrowing. A miscalculation — an Israeli strike, an American threat, a proxy clash — could ignite escalation precisely when the regime is most brittle.
What, then, is left? The answer is unsatisfying but necessary: disciplined diplomacy anchored in realism, not illusions. Regime change from outside would be catastrophic. Indifference to bloodshed corrodes legitimacy. Targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for violence, combined with humanitarian and economic channels that bypass the state, remain among the few tools available. Forums such as the UN and BRICS itself should not be stages for platitudes but venues for quiet pressure and accountability.
US President Donald Trump declared that “help is on its way” to Iranian protesters and cancelled meetings with Tehran, warning of strong retaliation, a stance that has energised solidarity demonstrations outside US embassies from Sydney to London, even though Washington has not specified what form that assistance will take. In contrast, BRICS partners have refrained from directly commenting on Iran’s internal crackdown, focusing instead on diplomatic settlement and multilateral engagement, such as reaffirming peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and upholding international law in summit communiqués without endorsing intervention.
This is the moment that will define BRICS: a moral stress test for an expanded multipolar order. Not a slogan, not a communiqué, but a live question of whether sovereignty can still coexist with human dignity when power is finally dispersed. Iran’s crisis is forcing that reckoning into the open. Accountability should land exactly where responsibility sits — on the command nodes that authorised unlawful force. Travel bans, asset freezes, and a short, independent forensic review would draw a clear line between consequence and collective punishment.
The message would be unmistakable: repression carries a price, but civilians are not collateral.
At the same time, relief must move faster than rhetoric. Food, fuel, cash, and connectivity cannot be held hostage to politics. Neutral humanitarian bypass channels, facilitated through the ICRC or UN mechanisms, reinforced by BRICS-backed escrow and swap arrangements, can deliver lifelines directly to households while sidestepping state rent-seeking. This is not generosity. It is strategic compassion, stabilising lives before despair hardens into collapse.
Finally, pressure must be quiet but relentless. Not megaphone diplomacy, but disciplined engagement. Discreet envoys, paired with a light-touch BRICS–UN monitoring cell, could track verified indicators and offer private guidance calibrated to change behaviour without detonating the system. The goal is not humiliation or regime change. It is restraint, stability, and credibility for Iran, and for the bloc that now claims it.
Handled well, this becomes proof that multipolarity can mature. Handled badly, it confirms the darkest fear: that power has multiplied, but responsibility has not.
Iran’s crisis exposes the unfinished business of multipolarity. Power has diversified; norms have not. BRICS can either become a shield for repression or a laboratory for responsible sovereignty. The choice will shape how the Global South is perceived — not as an abstract constituency, but as a moral actor in world politics.
For Iran’s citizens, the stakes are painfully immediate: dignity, bread, and the right to speak without being shot. For the international system, the stakes are structural. If emerging powers cannot reconcile stability with humanity, the promise of a fairer order will ring hollow. This is not merely Iran’s reckoning. It is a reckoning for a world learning, once again, that economics, legitimacy, and power cannot be separated without consequence.
South Africa Asks Iran to Withdraw Warships from BRICS Naval Drills After Trump Tariff Threat (Южная Африка потребовала от Ирана вывести военные корабли из военно-морских учений стран БРИКС после угроз Трампа ввести тарифы.) / Ukraine, January, 2026
Keywords: national_security, political_issues
2026-01-13
2026-01-13
Ukraine
Source: united24media.com
South Africa asked Iran to withdraw its ships from upcoming BRICS-linked naval exercises off its coast and take observer status instead, after US President Donald Trump threatened new tariffs targeting countries that trade with Tehran, according to The Moscow Times on January 13.
The request concerns the “Will for Peace 2026” drills, which South African officials have said will involve vessels from China, Russia, Iran, and other countries and run through mid-January, with activities centered near the Simon’s Town naval base outside Cape Town.
After US President Donald Trump stated in a Truth Social post on January 12 that “any Country doing business with the Islamic Republic of Iran will pay a Tariff of 25% on any and all business being done with the United States of America,” adding: “This Order is final and conclusive.”
The Moscow Times reported that Pretoria moved to limit Iran’s participation amid strains with the Trump administration and as it seeks to preserve trade ties with the US, including preferential market access under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which lapsed on September 30, 2025, and is under debate in Congress.
Two Iranian warships that arrived at South Africa’s main naval base in Simon’s Town are now expected to be withdrawn before the start of the exercises.
The drills are led by China and are set to include naval vessels from Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries.
Earlier, it was reported that naval forces from China, Russia, Iran, and South Africa launched the “Will for Peace 2026” exercise near Simon’s Town and False Bay, with drills framed around maritime security and safe navigation.
Source: united24media.com
South Africa asked Iran to withdraw its ships from upcoming BRICS-linked naval exercises off its coast and take observer status instead, after US President Donald Trump threatened new tariffs targeting countries that trade with Tehran, according to The Moscow Times on January 13.
The request concerns the “Will for Peace 2026” drills, which South African officials have said will involve vessels from China, Russia, Iran, and other countries and run through mid-January, with activities centered near the Simon’s Town naval base outside Cape Town.
After US President Donald Trump stated in a Truth Social post on January 12 that “any Country doing business with the Islamic Republic of Iran will pay a Tariff of 25% on any and all business being done with the United States of America,” adding: “This Order is final and conclusive.”
The Moscow Times reported that Pretoria moved to limit Iran’s participation amid strains with the Trump administration and as it seeks to preserve trade ties with the US, including preferential market access under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which lapsed on September 30, 2025, and is under debate in Congress.
Two Iranian warships that arrived at South Africa’s main naval base in Simon’s Town are now expected to be withdrawn before the start of the exercises.
The drills are led by China and are set to include naval vessels from Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries.
Earlier, it was reported that naval forces from China, Russia, Iran, and South Africa launched the “Will for Peace 2026” exercise near Simon’s Town and False Bay, with drills framed around maritime security and safe navigation.
Joint maritime drill among BRICS members wraps up off South Africa; features practicing rescuing hijacked commercial vessel: media (Завершились совместные морские учения стран БРИКС у берегов Южной Африки; в ходе них отрабатывалась операция по спасению захваченного коммерческого судна: СМИ) / China, January, 2026
Keywords:
2026-01-
2026-01-
China
Source: www.globaltimes.cn
Joint maritime drill among BRICS members wraps up off South Africa; features practicing rescuing hijacked commercial vessel: media
Chinese guided-missile destroyer Tangshan (Hull 122) is moored in False Bay, near Cape Town, South Africa on January 6, 2026. The Will For Peace 2026 exercise brings together navies from BRICS Plus countries for joint maritime safety operations, multiple foreign media reported. Photo: VCG
BRICS members, including China, Russia and South Africa, recently wrapped up a joint maritime exercise off South Africa, in which they practiced rescuing a hijacked commercial vessel, according to official Chinese media on Sunday.
The "Will for Peace 2026" joint maritime exercise successfully concluded in waters and airspace off South Africa on Friday local time, the military channel of China Central Television (CCTV) reported on Sunday.
According to the CCTV report, the entire exercise was divided into two phases. The harbor phase ran from January 9 to 12, which mainly includes an opening ceremony, ship visits, cultural and sports activities, professional and technical exchanges, and other events. The sea phase with live-force drills took place from Tuesday to Thursday, during which Chinese naval vessels and participating ships from other countries conducted drills focusing on subjects such as communication exercises, formation maneuvers, and helicopter transfer of the wounded.
In an exercise session on armed rescue of a hijacked commercial vessel, a Chinese special forces unit was deployed to carry out the rescue mission, joined by forces from the South African and Russian sides. The three assault units covered each other, jointly seized control of key parts of the vessel such as the bridge, and successfully rescued the simulated hostages, according to the report.
Zhang Junshe, a Chinese military affairs expert, told the Global Times that conducting relevant exercises can effectively enhance the capability to protect maritime security and the security of international shipping lanes.
The safety and smooth flow of maritime shipping lanes is a shared goal for the international community to safeguard, Zhang said.
China Military Bugle, an official media account under the PLA News Media Center, reported on Sunday that the joint exercise featured the PLA Navy’s guided missile destroyer Tangshan, comprehensive replenishment ship Taihu, a shipborne helicopter and dozens of special forces members. They collaborated with forces from BRICS members including Russian and South Africa, and carried out a full-element, multi-subject and high-intensity maritime joint exercise under the theme of joint actions to safeguard the security of key shipping lanes and economic activities, injecting positive energy into safeguarding regional peace and stability.
Source: www.globaltimes.cn
Joint maritime drill among BRICS members wraps up off South Africa; features practicing rescuing hijacked commercial vessel: media
Chinese guided-missile destroyer Tangshan (Hull 122) is moored in False Bay, near Cape Town, South Africa on January 6, 2026. The Will For Peace 2026 exercise brings together navies from BRICS Plus countries for joint maritime safety operations, multiple foreign media reported. Photo: VCG
BRICS members, including China, Russia and South Africa, recently wrapped up a joint maritime exercise off South Africa, in which they practiced rescuing a hijacked commercial vessel, according to official Chinese media on Sunday.
The "Will for Peace 2026" joint maritime exercise successfully concluded in waters and airspace off South Africa on Friday local time, the military channel of China Central Television (CCTV) reported on Sunday.
According to the CCTV report, the entire exercise was divided into two phases. The harbor phase ran from January 9 to 12, which mainly includes an opening ceremony, ship visits, cultural and sports activities, professional and technical exchanges, and other events. The sea phase with live-force drills took place from Tuesday to Thursday, during which Chinese naval vessels and participating ships from other countries conducted drills focusing on subjects such as communication exercises, formation maneuvers, and helicopter transfer of the wounded.
In an exercise session on armed rescue of a hijacked commercial vessel, a Chinese special forces unit was deployed to carry out the rescue mission, joined by forces from the South African and Russian sides. The three assault units covered each other, jointly seized control of key parts of the vessel such as the bridge, and successfully rescued the simulated hostages, according to the report.
Zhang Junshe, a Chinese military affairs expert, told the Global Times that conducting relevant exercises can effectively enhance the capability to protect maritime security and the security of international shipping lanes.
The safety and smooth flow of maritime shipping lanes is a shared goal for the international community to safeguard, Zhang said.
China Military Bugle, an official media account under the PLA News Media Center, reported on Sunday that the joint exercise featured the PLA Navy’s guided missile destroyer Tangshan, comprehensive replenishment ship Taihu, a shipborne helicopter and dozens of special forces members. They collaborated with forces from BRICS members including Russian and South Africa, and carried out a full-element, multi-subject and high-intensity maritime joint exercise under the theme of joint actions to safeguard the security of key shipping lanes and economic activities, injecting positive energy into safeguarding regional peace and stability.
BRICS 'important forum' for cooperation, practical responses, says India amid 'geopolitical uncertainties' (Индия заявляет, что БРИКС — «важный форум» для сотрудничества и практических решений в условиях «геополитической неопределенности».) / Turkey, January, 2026
Keywords: brics+, quotation
2026-01-13
2026-01-13
Turkey
Source: www.aa.com.tr
NEW DELHI
The BRICS bloc remains an “important" forum that encourages “dialogue and cooperation and practical responses,” amid "geopolitical uncertainties," Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar said Tuesday.
Jaishankar also unveiled the BRICS logo and the launch of the BRICS website in New Delhi as India chairs the bloc for 2026.
“The current global environment presents complex and interlinked challenges, geopolitical uncertainties, complicated economic landscapes, climate-related risks, technological changes, and persistent development gaps that continue to affect countries across regions,” Jaishankar said.
He added: “In this context, BRICS remains an important forum that encourages dialogue and cooperation and practical responses, taking into account national priorities at different stages of development.”
Noting that India approaches its leadership of the bloc with a “humanity-first and a people-centric approach,” Jaishankar said this year's theme reflects their “belief that cooperation among BRICS members can help address shared challenges in a balanced and inclusive manner.”
He stressed that "at a time when the world is also navigating multiple complex challenges, the call for a reinvigorated, inclusive, and effective multilateral order has never been more urgent."
“BRICS must commit to a reformed multilateralism that reflects contemporary realities, one where institutions like the United Nations, the WTO (World Trade Organization), IMF (International Monetary Fund), and the World Bank are representative and inclusive,” said Jaishankar, adding: “India will seek to make its chairship inclusive, practical, people-centered, and outcome-oriented.”
BRICS was formed in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, with South Africa joining in 2010. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Iran later joined, expanding the group to 11 members, alongside 10 strategic partner countries.
The bloc aims to create alternative financial mechanisms, reduce dollar dependency, and increase Global South representation in international institutions, challenging Western-led governance structures.
In 2025, Brazil led the bloc.
Source: www.aa.com.tr
NEW DELHI
The BRICS bloc remains an “important" forum that encourages “dialogue and cooperation and practical responses,” amid "geopolitical uncertainties," Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar said Tuesday.
Jaishankar also unveiled the BRICS logo and the launch of the BRICS website in New Delhi as India chairs the bloc for 2026.
“The current global environment presents complex and interlinked challenges, geopolitical uncertainties, complicated economic landscapes, climate-related risks, technological changes, and persistent development gaps that continue to affect countries across regions,” Jaishankar said.
He added: “In this context, BRICS remains an important forum that encourages dialogue and cooperation and practical responses, taking into account national priorities at different stages of development.”
Noting that India approaches its leadership of the bloc with a “humanity-first and a people-centric approach,” Jaishankar said this year's theme reflects their “belief that cooperation among BRICS members can help address shared challenges in a balanced and inclusive manner.”
He stressed that "at a time when the world is also navigating multiple complex challenges, the call for a reinvigorated, inclusive, and effective multilateral order has never been more urgent."
“BRICS must commit to a reformed multilateralism that reflects contemporary realities, one where institutions like the United Nations, the WTO (World Trade Organization), IMF (International Monetary Fund), and the World Bank are representative and inclusive,” said Jaishankar, adding: “India will seek to make its chairship inclusive, practical, people-centered, and outcome-oriented.”
BRICS was formed in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, with South Africa joining in 2010. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Iran later joined, expanding the group to 11 members, alongside 10 strategic partner countries.
The bloc aims to create alternative financial mechanisms, reduce dollar dependency, and increase Global South representation in international institutions, challenging Western-led governance structures.
In 2025, Brazil led the bloc.
EAM’s address during the launch of BRICS India 2026 Logo, Theme and Website (Выступление министра иностранных дел Индии во время презентации логотипа, темы и веб-сайта БРИКС Индия 2026.) / India, January, 2026
Keywords: brics+, quotation, chairmanship
2026-01-13
2026-01-13
India
Source: www.mea.gov.in
My Ministerial Colleagues, Shri Kirti Vardhan Singh ji, Pabitra Margherita ji,
Secretaries of MEA,
Representatives from BRICS Countries,
Excellencies,
Senior officials from Government of India Ministries,
Representatives from Think Tanks and Business Chambers,
Colleagues, Friends,
I am extremely pleased to welcome you all this morning to the formal unveiling of the Logo, Theme and Website for India’s Chairship of BRICS for 2026.
2. As we have gathered today on the eve of Makara Sankranti, a festival known by the many names also Lohri, Magh Bihu, Pongal and that celebrates the sun’s celestial journey northward, known as Uttarayana, I extend my warmest greetings to each one of you on this auspicious occasion. Just as these festivals convey hope and goodwill, India’s BRICS Chairship will seek to bring together the potential of BRICS countries for the greater global welfare.
3. Friends, when India prepares to assume the BRICS Chairship in 2026, we do so at an important moment in the grouping’s journey. In 2026, BRICS will complete twenty years since its inception, during which it has steadily evolved into a significant platform for cooperation among emerging markets and developing economies.
4. Over the years, BRICS has expanded its agenda and membership, responding to changing global realities while remaining focused on people centric development, fostering dialogue, and promoting practical cooperation.
5. The current global environment presents complex and interlinked challenges. Geopolitical uncertainties, complicated economic landscapes, climate-related risks, technological changes, and persistent development gaps continue to affect countries across regions. In this context, BRICS remains an important forum that encourages dialogue and cooperation, and practical responses, taking into account national priorities and different stages of development.
6. India approaches its Chairship with a ‘humanity first’ and a ‘people-centric’ approach, inspired by the guidance of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Our Chairship theme - "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”- reflects our belief that cooperation among BRICS members can help address shared challenges in a balanced and in an inclusive manner. The theme underscores the importance of strengthening capacities, promoting innovation, and ensuring sustainable development for the benefit of all.
7. The Logo that we unveil today reflects this approach. It combines elements of tradition and modernity, and the petals incorporate the colours of all BRICS member countries, representing unity in diversity and a strong sense of shared purpose. The Logo conveys the idea that BRICS draws strength from the collective contributions of its members, while respecting their distinct identities.
8. The BRICS India website, which has also been launched this morning, will serve as a common platform during India’s Chairship. It will provide information on meetings, initiatives, and outcomes, and will facilitate greater transparency and engagement. It will also help timely dissemination of information throughout the year.
9. Friends, the four broad priorities of India’s Chairship - Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation, and Sustainability – they will provide a coherent and balanced framework across the three foundational pillars of BRICS: political and security, economic and financial, cultural and people-to-people exchanges.
10. Under the Resilience pillar, we will endeavour to build structural institutional strengths capable of weathering global shocks. India intends to work with BRICS partners to build resilience in agriculture, in health, in disaster risk reduction, in energy and supply chains, including through cooperative frameworks that enhance collective preparedness and response.
11. Innovation remains a central driver of global economic development. The deployment of new and emerging technologies is essential to addressing socio-economic challenges, particularly those confronting developing countries, while maintaining a people-centric approach. Enhanced cooperation in areas such as Startups, MSMEs, and new and emerging technologies can contribute meaningfully to building a more equitable world.
12. Excellencies, Colleagues, India attaches equal importance to cooperation and sustainability and will work to advancing climate action, promoting clean energy, and supporting sustainable development pathways in a manner that is fair and sensitive to national circumstances.
13. At a time, when the world is also navigating multiple complex challenges - the call for a reinvigorated, inclusive and effective multilateral order has never been more urgent. BRICS must commit to a reformed multilateralism that reflects contemporary realities — one where institutions like the United Nations, the WTO, IMF, and World Bank are representative and inclusive.
14. Founded by BRICS countries, the New Development Bank has emerged as an important instrument of economic cooperation, promoting infrastructure and sustainable development of its member countries. India remains committed to supporting activities and efforts to further strengthen the Bank as a credible, responsive, and financially sustainable institution.
15. People-to-people exchanges will remain an essential component of BRICS and especially of our Chairship, with continued emphasis on youth, culture, education, sports, tourism, and academic interactions, and they will all help us to build mutual understanding and further deepen our collaboration. These exchanges contribute to creating a stronger sense of community within BRICS and lay the foundation for long-term cooperation.
16. India views BRICS as a constructive platform for dialogue and development, complementing the broader multilateral system. Guided by the principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality and consensus, India will seek to make its Chairship inclusive, practical, people-centric and outcome-oriented.
17. So, let me conclude by saying that I look forward to the cooperation and support of all BRICS members, partner countries and other stakeholders as we work towards and together during India’s Chairship. I count on your support.
Once again, I thank you all for joining us today.
New Delhi
January 13, 2026
Source: www.mea.gov.in
My Ministerial Colleagues, Shri Kirti Vardhan Singh ji, Pabitra Margherita ji,
Secretaries of MEA,
Representatives from BRICS Countries,
Excellencies,
Senior officials from Government of India Ministries,
Representatives from Think Tanks and Business Chambers,
Colleagues, Friends,
I am extremely pleased to welcome you all this morning to the formal unveiling of the Logo, Theme and Website for India’s Chairship of BRICS for 2026.
2. As we have gathered today on the eve of Makara Sankranti, a festival known by the many names also Lohri, Magh Bihu, Pongal and that celebrates the sun’s celestial journey northward, known as Uttarayana, I extend my warmest greetings to each one of you on this auspicious occasion. Just as these festivals convey hope and goodwill, India’s BRICS Chairship will seek to bring together the potential of BRICS countries for the greater global welfare.
3. Friends, when India prepares to assume the BRICS Chairship in 2026, we do so at an important moment in the grouping’s journey. In 2026, BRICS will complete twenty years since its inception, during which it has steadily evolved into a significant platform for cooperation among emerging markets and developing economies.
4. Over the years, BRICS has expanded its agenda and membership, responding to changing global realities while remaining focused on people centric development, fostering dialogue, and promoting practical cooperation.
5. The current global environment presents complex and interlinked challenges. Geopolitical uncertainties, complicated economic landscapes, climate-related risks, technological changes, and persistent development gaps continue to affect countries across regions. In this context, BRICS remains an important forum that encourages dialogue and cooperation, and practical responses, taking into account national priorities and different stages of development.
6. India approaches its Chairship with a ‘humanity first’ and a ‘people-centric’ approach, inspired by the guidance of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Our Chairship theme - "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”- reflects our belief that cooperation among BRICS members can help address shared challenges in a balanced and in an inclusive manner. The theme underscores the importance of strengthening capacities, promoting innovation, and ensuring sustainable development for the benefit of all.
7. The Logo that we unveil today reflects this approach. It combines elements of tradition and modernity, and the petals incorporate the colours of all BRICS member countries, representing unity in diversity and a strong sense of shared purpose. The Logo conveys the idea that BRICS draws strength from the collective contributions of its members, while respecting their distinct identities.
8. The BRICS India website, which has also been launched this morning, will serve as a common platform during India’s Chairship. It will provide information on meetings, initiatives, and outcomes, and will facilitate greater transparency and engagement. It will also help timely dissemination of information throughout the year.
9. Friends, the four broad priorities of India’s Chairship - Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation, and Sustainability – they will provide a coherent and balanced framework across the three foundational pillars of BRICS: political and security, economic and financial, cultural and people-to-people exchanges.
10. Under the Resilience pillar, we will endeavour to build structural institutional strengths capable of weathering global shocks. India intends to work with BRICS partners to build resilience in agriculture, in health, in disaster risk reduction, in energy and supply chains, including through cooperative frameworks that enhance collective preparedness and response.
11. Innovation remains a central driver of global economic development. The deployment of new and emerging technologies is essential to addressing socio-economic challenges, particularly those confronting developing countries, while maintaining a people-centric approach. Enhanced cooperation in areas such as Startups, MSMEs, and new and emerging technologies can contribute meaningfully to building a more equitable world.
12. Excellencies, Colleagues, India attaches equal importance to cooperation and sustainability and will work to advancing climate action, promoting clean energy, and supporting sustainable development pathways in a manner that is fair and sensitive to national circumstances.
13. At a time, when the world is also navigating multiple complex challenges - the call for a reinvigorated, inclusive and effective multilateral order has never been more urgent. BRICS must commit to a reformed multilateralism that reflects contemporary realities — one where institutions like the United Nations, the WTO, IMF, and World Bank are representative and inclusive.
14. Founded by BRICS countries, the New Development Bank has emerged as an important instrument of economic cooperation, promoting infrastructure and sustainable development of its member countries. India remains committed to supporting activities and efforts to further strengthen the Bank as a credible, responsive, and financially sustainable institution.
15. People-to-people exchanges will remain an essential component of BRICS and especially of our Chairship, with continued emphasis on youth, culture, education, sports, tourism, and academic interactions, and they will all help us to build mutual understanding and further deepen our collaboration. These exchanges contribute to creating a stronger sense of community within BRICS and lay the foundation for long-term cooperation.
16. India views BRICS as a constructive platform for dialogue and development, complementing the broader multilateral system. Guided by the principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality and consensus, India will seek to make its Chairship inclusive, practical, people-centric and outcome-oriented.
17. So, let me conclude by saying that I look forward to the cooperation and support of all BRICS members, partner countries and other stakeholders as we work towards and together during India’s Chairship. I count on your support.
Once again, I thank you all for joining us today.
New Delhi
January 13, 2026
ASEAN’s Multilateral Dilemma: Continuity and Change from NAM to BRICS (Многосторонняя дилемма АСЕАН: преемственность и изменения от Движения неприсоединения к БРИКС) / Greece, January, 2026
Keywords: brics+
2026-01-14
2026-01-14
Greece
Source: moderndiplomacy.eu
ASEAN’s Multilateral Dilemma: Continuity and Change from NAM to BRICS
ASEAN’s enduring strength has never been its ability to project power, but its capacity to manage diversity through restraint, process, and dialogue. In an increasingly polarized strategic environment, pressures to align more explicitly with emerging blocs such as BRICS risk diluting ASEAN’s long-standing emphasis on autonomy and consensus. For Southeast Asia, security is less about joining alternative power centers than about preserving decision-making space amid intensifying great-power rivalry. A revitalized non-aligned approach—adapted to contemporary challenges such as economic fragmentation, digital governance, and maritime security—offers ASEAN greater flexibility to engage all major actors without becoming dependent on any. In this sense, non-alignment is not a rejection of cooperation but a pragmatic strategy to sustain ASEAN centrality in a multipolar, yet deeply contested, regional order.
Let us continue with a rather simple question: Why does ASEAN’s security lie in non-alignment, not bloc membership?
For more than two decades, the “Asian Century” has been treated as an inevitability rather than a hypothesis. Yet inevitability is not strategy, and Asia’s economic rise has not produced commensurate strategic autonomy. As this author warned in No Asian Century, “growth without agency is not power.” It is exposure.
Nowhere is this clearer than in ASEAN’s strategic predicament.
The region is richer, more connected, and more central to global supply chains than ever. It is also more militarized, more contested, and more instrumentalized by external powers. This is not ascent; it is crowded relevance.
Consequentially, ASEAN is increasingly urged to anchor itself more firmly in BRICS—or, alternatively, to revive the logic of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The choice is often framed as outdated idealism versus modern multipolar pragmatism. This framing is false.
BRICS: an alternative center, not an alternative logic
BRICS markets itself as a corrective to Western dominance. In reality, it substitutes one form of centrality for another. The bloc is multipolar in composition but hierarchical in effect, shaped by stark asymmetries of power, demography, and strategic ambition.
For ASEAN (and RI for that matter), deeper institutional attachment to BRICS would not mean insulation from great-power rivalry. It would mean internalizing it. Sino-Indian competition, Russia’s confrontation with the Atlantic world, and the geopolitical agendas of newly admitted members are not externalities. They are the bloc’s operating environment.
As one of the co-authors observed, “multipolarity without rules multiplies friction.” For smaller and mid-sized states, friction is not leverage; it is vulnerability.
BRICS offers financial instruments and political visibility, but not protection in the sense ASEAN requires. Protection implies predictability, autonomy, and room for maneuver. A bloc dominated by continental powers with unresolved rivalries offers none of these.
Non-alignment: misunderstood, not obsolete
Non-alignment is often caricatured as neutrality. Historically, it was the opposite: a strategy of autonomy (active peaceful coexistence—strategic equidistancing engagement, not a passive neutrality) in a system designed to deny it. NAM failed not because its premise was wrong, but because it lacked economic integration, technological depth, and institutional discipline. Those deficits are not arguments against non-alignment today. They are arguments for upgrading it.
The contemporary international system increasingly resembles the one that gave rise to NAM: weaponized finance, sanctions as diplomacy, fractured trade regimes, and information warfare. In such a system, alignment reduces options; autonomy preserves them.
ASEAN already behaves as a de facto non-aligned actor—hedging, consensus-building, and resisting exclusive security commitments. The problem is not doctrine; it is institutional confidence.
ASEAN’s real security deficit
ASEAN’s vulnerability is not military inferiority. It is structural dependence. Security in 2026 is decided less by troop numbers than by (i) control over supply chains and standards; (ii) digital and data sovereignty; (iii) food and energy resilience; and (iv) narrative and diplomatic bandwidth—to name but a few of the most pressing ones.
Neither BRICS nor NAM can deliver these automatically. But BRICS constrains ASEAN’s room to build them independently, while non-alignment preserves that space. As No Asian Century (almost two decades old but still highly relevant work) reminds us, “Asia’s problem is not lack of power but lack of cohesion.” ASEAN’s cohesion is diluted, not strengthened, by bloc discipline.
(We are drifting from a Kantian promise of cooperative order into a Hobbesian reality of coerced choice. Rules increasingly yield to power, norms to narratives, and multilateralism to managed loyalty. In such a system, as Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic has warned, the message to smaller states is blunt: comply or die. For actors like ASEAN, the challenge is not to moralize this shift but to survive it—by preserving strategic autonomy in a world where alignment no longer guarantees protection, only obedience.
Centrality must be defended, not donated.
ASEAN’s strategic value lies in being indispensable, not aligned. The moment it becomes a junior partner in any camp, its celebrated “centrality” becomes rhetorical.
Selective engagement with BRICS is sensible. Conceptual renewal of non-alignment is necessary. Exclusive commitment to either is unnecessary—and risky.
There may be no Asian Century, as Bajrektarevic famously argued (long ago), because Asia has yet to decide whether it wants to be a subject or a venue of global politics. ASEAN’s answer to that question will determine its security more than any acronym it joins.
History rarely rewards those who choose sides early. It remembers those who made themselves unavoidable.
*Anis H. Bajrektarevic, Chairperson and prof. Intl. Relations & Global Pol. Studies
Source: moderndiplomacy.eu
ASEAN’s Multilateral Dilemma: Continuity and Change from NAM to BRICS
ASEAN’s enduring strength has never been its ability to project power, but its capacity to manage diversity through restraint, process, and dialogue. In an increasingly polarized strategic environment, pressures to align more explicitly with emerging blocs such as BRICS risk diluting ASEAN’s long-standing emphasis on autonomy and consensus. For Southeast Asia, security is less about joining alternative power centers than about preserving decision-making space amid intensifying great-power rivalry. A revitalized non-aligned approach—adapted to contemporary challenges such as economic fragmentation, digital governance, and maritime security—offers ASEAN greater flexibility to engage all major actors without becoming dependent on any. In this sense, non-alignment is not a rejection of cooperation but a pragmatic strategy to sustain ASEAN centrality in a multipolar, yet deeply contested, regional order.
Let us continue with a rather simple question: Why does ASEAN’s security lie in non-alignment, not bloc membership?
For more than two decades, the “Asian Century” has been treated as an inevitability rather than a hypothesis. Yet inevitability is not strategy, and Asia’s economic rise has not produced commensurate strategic autonomy. As this author warned in No Asian Century, “growth without agency is not power.” It is exposure.
Nowhere is this clearer than in ASEAN’s strategic predicament.
The region is richer, more connected, and more central to global supply chains than ever. It is also more militarized, more contested, and more instrumentalized by external powers. This is not ascent; it is crowded relevance.
Consequentially, ASEAN is increasingly urged to anchor itself more firmly in BRICS—or, alternatively, to revive the logic of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The choice is often framed as outdated idealism versus modern multipolar pragmatism. This framing is false.
BRICS: an alternative center, not an alternative logic
BRICS markets itself as a corrective to Western dominance. In reality, it substitutes one form of centrality for another. The bloc is multipolar in composition but hierarchical in effect, shaped by stark asymmetries of power, demography, and strategic ambition.
For ASEAN (and RI for that matter), deeper institutional attachment to BRICS would not mean insulation from great-power rivalry. It would mean internalizing it. Sino-Indian competition, Russia’s confrontation with the Atlantic world, and the geopolitical agendas of newly admitted members are not externalities. They are the bloc’s operating environment.
As one of the co-authors observed, “multipolarity without rules multiplies friction.” For smaller and mid-sized states, friction is not leverage; it is vulnerability.
BRICS offers financial instruments and political visibility, but not protection in the sense ASEAN requires. Protection implies predictability, autonomy, and room for maneuver. A bloc dominated by continental powers with unresolved rivalries offers none of these.
Non-alignment: misunderstood, not obsolete
Non-alignment is often caricatured as neutrality. Historically, it was the opposite: a strategy of autonomy (active peaceful coexistence—strategic equidistancing engagement, not a passive neutrality) in a system designed to deny it. NAM failed not because its premise was wrong, but because it lacked economic integration, technological depth, and institutional discipline. Those deficits are not arguments against non-alignment today. They are arguments for upgrading it.
The contemporary international system increasingly resembles the one that gave rise to NAM: weaponized finance, sanctions as diplomacy, fractured trade regimes, and information warfare. In such a system, alignment reduces options; autonomy preserves them.
ASEAN already behaves as a de facto non-aligned actor—hedging, consensus-building, and resisting exclusive security commitments. The problem is not doctrine; it is institutional confidence.
ASEAN’s real security deficit
ASEAN’s vulnerability is not military inferiority. It is structural dependence. Security in 2026 is decided less by troop numbers than by (i) control over supply chains and standards; (ii) digital and data sovereignty; (iii) food and energy resilience; and (iv) narrative and diplomatic bandwidth—to name but a few of the most pressing ones.
Neither BRICS nor NAM can deliver these automatically. But BRICS constrains ASEAN’s room to build them independently, while non-alignment preserves that space. As No Asian Century (almost two decades old but still highly relevant work) reminds us, “Asia’s problem is not lack of power but lack of cohesion.” ASEAN’s cohesion is diluted, not strengthened, by bloc discipline.
(We are drifting from a Kantian promise of cooperative order into a Hobbesian reality of coerced choice. Rules increasingly yield to power, norms to narratives, and multilateralism to managed loyalty. In such a system, as Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic has warned, the message to smaller states is blunt: comply or die. For actors like ASEAN, the challenge is not to moralize this shift but to survive it—by preserving strategic autonomy in a world where alignment no longer guarantees protection, only obedience.
Centrality must be defended, not donated.
ASEAN’s strategic value lies in being indispensable, not aligned. The moment it becomes a junior partner in any camp, its celebrated “centrality” becomes rhetorical.
Selective engagement with BRICS is sensible. Conceptual renewal of non-alignment is necessary. Exclusive commitment to either is unnecessary—and risky.
There may be no Asian Century, as Bajrektarevic famously argued (long ago), because Asia has yet to decide whether it wants to be a subject or a venue of global politics. ASEAN’s answer to that question will determine its security more than any acronym it joins.
History rarely rewards those who choose sides early. It remembers those who made themselves unavoidable.
*Anis H. Bajrektarevic, Chairperson and prof. Intl. Relations & Global Pol. Studies
India’s BRICS Presidency: South Africa at a Diplomatic Crossroads (Председательство Индии в БРИКС: Южная Африка на дипломатическом перепутье) / India, January, 2026
Keywords: brics+, political_issues, chairmanship
2026-01-14
2026-01-14
India
Source: www.orfonline.org
India’s leadership of BRICS in 2026 could allow South Africa to consolidate the gains of its G20 presidency while navigating the pressures of bloc expansion and strained ties with Washington
As India prepares to assume the BRICS chairmanship in January 2026, South Africa finds itself at a pivotal moment in its foreign policy trajectory. Pretoria is coming off a year of prominentdiplomatic leadership, anchored by a widely recognised G20 presidency that foregrounded African priorities on debt relief, climate finance, development financing, and global governance reform. Coming amid strained ties with the United States, the G20 presidency underscored South Africa’s enduring commitment to inclusive multilateralism and strategic autonomy.
Yet the international environment in which South Africa must now operate is becoming more demanding. The return of a Trump administration sceptical of multilateral institutions and non-aligned middle powers, and increasingly transactional in its engagement with Africa, has narrowed diplomatic space for countries seeking to pursue independent policy pathways. Against this backdrop, India’s BRICS presidency presents South Africa with both an opportunity and a test: whether it can convert recent diplomatic momentum into sustained influence within a global governance system that is clearly in flux.
Setting the Stage: India’s 2026 BRICS Presidency
India formally assumed the BRICS chairmanship on 1 January 2026, following Brazil’s presidency, which prioritised Global South cooperation for more inclusive and sustainable governance. Brazil’s tenure consolidated the bloc’s expanded membership and delivered tangible outcomes, including the Rio Declaration, the first Framework Declaration on Climate Finance, and a unified statement on the global governance of artificial intelligence. These achievements laid important groundwork for institutional continuity at a moment when BRICS is grappling with the opportunities and constraints of expansion.
India’s resistance to more radical proposals, such as a BRICS common currency or de-dollarisation, has helped preserve the grouping’s credibility while keeping it accessible to middle powers wary of being drawn into geopolitical blocs. For Pretoria, India’s chairmanship offers a stabilising hand at a time when BRICS risks being overstretched by internal diversity and external pressure.
New Delhi has signalled that it intends to build on this foundation while maintaining continuity. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has articulated a vision for BRICS centred on resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability, emphasising people-centric development and a ‘humanity-first’ approach to global governance. India’s Ambassador Sudhakar Dalela has reinforced that the 2026 presidency will be guided by continuity, consolidation and consensus—an approach that reflects India’s long-standing preference for pragmatic multilateralism over ideological confrontation.
This positioning matters for South Africa. India occupies a distinctive place within BRICS: a Global South leader that remains embedded in the existing international system, committed to reform while avoiding disruptive measures. India’s resistance to more radical proposals, such as a BRICS common currency or de-dollarisation, has helped preserve the grouping’s credibility while keeping it accessible to middle powers wary of being drawn into geopolitical blocs. For Pretoria, India’s chairmanship offers a stabilising hand at a time when BRICS risks being overstretched by internal diversity and external pressure.
Navigating Strategic Autonomy
South Africa’s foreign policy has long been anchored in non-alignment and strategic autonomy. However, the return of a US administration that has adopted a more sceptical approach towardsmultilateral forums and has shown limited accommodation for the policy preferences of non-aligned middle powers has made this posture more costly. Washington’s critical response to South Africa’s G20 leadership, coupled with its broader reassessment of engagement with multilateral institutions and more adversarial posture towards BRICS, illustrates growing constraints on policy independence. President Donald Trump has repeatedly characterised BRICS as an “anti-American bloc” and threatened punitive economic measures against its members, signalling a more confrontational approach that seeks to deter collective action outside US-led frameworks.
Washington’s critical response to South Africa’s G20 leadership, coupled with its broader reassessment of engagement with multilateral institutions and more adversarial posture towards BRICS, illustrates growing constraints on policy independence.
In this environment, India’s leadership of BRICS assumes particular significance for South Africa. India’s own commitment to strategic autonomy and multi-alignment positions it as a moderating force within the bloc—one that is inclined toward institutional reform rather than ideological confrontation. Under India’s chairmanship, BRICS is more likely to function as a platform for negotiated autonomy than as a vehicle for opposition to the West. This creates space for Pretoria to balance relations with major powers while preserving strategic autonomy across competing alignments.
At the same time, BRICS is not without its constraints. The bloc’s recent expansion has introduced a more diverse set of political priorities and economic structures, complicating consensus-building and raising questions about institutional coherence. These internal pressures coincide with a US foreign policy that places greater emphasis on bilateral leverage over multilateral engagement, heightening risks for middle powers such as South Africa. However, these dynamics have also reinforced the rationale for collective engagement. A more transactional external environment strengthens incentives for BRICS members to preserve a forum that enables coordination, hedging, and political cover.
This logic resonates with South African policy debates, including recent commentary from domestic think tanks such as the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), which have emphasised the need to diversify partnerships without becoming entangled in great-power rivalry. BRICS’ original objective of advocating greater representation for emerging economies in global institutions, through reform of bodies such as the UN Security Council and the Bretton Woods institutions, aligns closely with South Africa’s long-standing diplomatic priorities. India’s stewardship offers continuity at a moment when both expansion-related complexity and a more challenging external environment threaten to test the bloc’s cohesion.
Under India’s chairmanship, BRICS is more likely to function as a platform for negotiated autonomy than as a vehicle for opposition to the West. This creates space for Pretoria to balance relations with major powers while preserving strategic autonomy across competing alignments.
Consolidating G20 Gains
South Africa’s G20 presidency demonstrated how a middle power from the Global South can shape global norms despite limited material leverage. By elevating African development priorities, debt vulnerabilities, and climate finance needs into mainstream global discourse, Pretoria generated significant normative capital. The challenge now is ensuring that these gains do not dissipate as attention shifts to other global priorities.
India’s BRICS presidency offers a platform to consolidate and extend this agenda. BRICS, in contrast to the G20, is explicitly oriented towards the concerns of emerging markets and developing economies, providing a complementary arena in which African priorities can be institutionalised. South Africa can leverage the BRICS platform to sustain momentum on issues such as reform of multilateral development banks, innovative financing mechanisms, and enhanced African representation in global economic governance.
The convergence between BRICS, the G20, and Brazil’s hosting of COP30 in 2025 further strengthens this opportunity. India has signalled its intention to explore synergies between these processes, particularly in areas such as climate finance and the governance of artificial intelligence. This convergence offers South Africa, a longstanding proponent of just and accessible climate finance, a pathway to embed African concerns within emerging governance frameworks.
South Africa as a Bridge-Builder in the BRICS Framework
BRICS remains one of South Africa’s most important diplomatic arenas, both as a platform for Global South coordination and as a means of amplifying African agency. India’s chairmanship provides an opportunity for Pretoria to work with a like-minded partner to refocus BRICS on development, practical cooperation, and institutional credibility, areas where South Africa’s diplomacy has traditionally been strongest.
South Africa can leverage the BRICS platform to sustain momentum on issues such as reform of multilateral development banks, innovative financing mechanisms, and enhanced African representation in global economic governance.
This aligns with President Cyril Ramaphosa’s articulation of South Africa as a bridge-builder: a state capable of mediating between regions, interests, and ideological divides. It also resonates with growing calls for South Africa to use BRICS more strategically to advance African industrialisation, energy transitions, and technological competitiveness, rather than treating membership as symbolic.
The broader continental context reinforces this imperative. Africa’s demographic expansion, growing economic potential, and increasing geopolitical visibility have made it a focal point of global competition. Meanwhile, the second Trump administration’s retrenchment from Africa has created strategic vacuums. In this environment, BRICS offers South Africa a space to consolidate African interests and project continental priorities on its own terms.
Defining Africa-Centric Objectives in BRICS
To maximise the opportunity presented by India’s chairmanship, South Africa should focus on several credible, deliverable priorities that align with both countries’ interests.
First, reform of the global financial architecture should remain central. India’s support for International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota reform, the expansion of the New Development Bank, and initiatives such as the proposed BRICS Multilateral Guarantee Initiative align closely with South Africa’s advocacy for fairer access to development finance. These efforts complement African calls for debt relief and improved creditworthiness.
Second, artificial intelligence, digital public infrastructure, and skills development offer a promising avenue for cooperation. India’s experience with digital public infrastructure provides a practical model for inclusive development, and initiatives such as the proposed G20–Africa Skills Multiplier could help address Africa’s demographic and employment challenges through knowledge transfer rather than dependency.
India’s support for International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota reform, the expansion of the New Development Bank, and initiatives such as the proposed BRICS Multilateral Guarantee Initiative align closely with South Africa’s advocacy for fairer access to development finance.
Third, climate finance and preparedness must remain a priority. Building on Brazil’s COP30 agenda, South Africa can collaborate with India to advance just transition financing, technology transfer, and climate resilience frameworks that reflect Global South realities.
Assessing the Strategic Utility of BRICS for South Africa
India’s 2026 BRICS presidency does not guarantee South Africa influence. It does, however, offer a rare alignment of leadership, timing, and institutional opportunity. In a world where traditional governance structures are losing legitimacy and geopolitical competition is intensifying, the question is not whether BRICS will remake the global order, but whether states like South Africa can use it effectively.
For Pretoria, this will require strategy rather than rhetorical ambition. By leveraging India’s pragmatic leadership, consolidating gains from its G20 presidency, and championing focused priorities within BRICS, South Africa can enhance its resilience, protect its strategic autonomy, and reinforce its role as a credible leader in the Global South.
As global power continues to diffuse, Africa’s task is not to choose sides but to shape the terms of engagement. Whether South Africa seizes that opportunity under India’s BRICS chairmanship will be a defining test of its foreign policy maturity.
Aaliyah Vayez is an independent IR analyst specialising in African foreign policy and BRICS.
Source: www.orfonline.org
India’s leadership of BRICS in 2026 could allow South Africa to consolidate the gains of its G20 presidency while navigating the pressures of bloc expansion and strained ties with Washington
As India prepares to assume the BRICS chairmanship in January 2026, South Africa finds itself at a pivotal moment in its foreign policy trajectory. Pretoria is coming off a year of prominentdiplomatic leadership, anchored by a widely recognised G20 presidency that foregrounded African priorities on debt relief, climate finance, development financing, and global governance reform. Coming amid strained ties with the United States, the G20 presidency underscored South Africa’s enduring commitment to inclusive multilateralism and strategic autonomy.
Yet the international environment in which South Africa must now operate is becoming more demanding. The return of a Trump administration sceptical of multilateral institutions and non-aligned middle powers, and increasingly transactional in its engagement with Africa, has narrowed diplomatic space for countries seeking to pursue independent policy pathways. Against this backdrop, India’s BRICS presidency presents South Africa with both an opportunity and a test: whether it can convert recent diplomatic momentum into sustained influence within a global governance system that is clearly in flux.
Setting the Stage: India’s 2026 BRICS Presidency
India formally assumed the BRICS chairmanship on 1 January 2026, following Brazil’s presidency, which prioritised Global South cooperation for more inclusive and sustainable governance. Brazil’s tenure consolidated the bloc’s expanded membership and delivered tangible outcomes, including the Rio Declaration, the first Framework Declaration on Climate Finance, and a unified statement on the global governance of artificial intelligence. These achievements laid important groundwork for institutional continuity at a moment when BRICS is grappling with the opportunities and constraints of expansion.
India’s resistance to more radical proposals, such as a BRICS common currency or de-dollarisation, has helped preserve the grouping’s credibility while keeping it accessible to middle powers wary of being drawn into geopolitical blocs. For Pretoria, India’s chairmanship offers a stabilising hand at a time when BRICS risks being overstretched by internal diversity and external pressure.
New Delhi has signalled that it intends to build on this foundation while maintaining continuity. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has articulated a vision for BRICS centred on resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability, emphasising people-centric development and a ‘humanity-first’ approach to global governance. India’s Ambassador Sudhakar Dalela has reinforced that the 2026 presidency will be guided by continuity, consolidation and consensus—an approach that reflects India’s long-standing preference for pragmatic multilateralism over ideological confrontation.
This positioning matters for South Africa. India occupies a distinctive place within BRICS: a Global South leader that remains embedded in the existing international system, committed to reform while avoiding disruptive measures. India’s resistance to more radical proposals, such as a BRICS common currency or de-dollarisation, has helped preserve the grouping’s credibility while keeping it accessible to middle powers wary of being drawn into geopolitical blocs. For Pretoria, India’s chairmanship offers a stabilising hand at a time when BRICS risks being overstretched by internal diversity and external pressure.
Navigating Strategic Autonomy
South Africa’s foreign policy has long been anchored in non-alignment and strategic autonomy. However, the return of a US administration that has adopted a more sceptical approach towardsmultilateral forums and has shown limited accommodation for the policy preferences of non-aligned middle powers has made this posture more costly. Washington’s critical response to South Africa’s G20 leadership, coupled with its broader reassessment of engagement with multilateral institutions and more adversarial posture towards BRICS, illustrates growing constraints on policy independence. President Donald Trump has repeatedly characterised BRICS as an “anti-American bloc” and threatened punitive economic measures against its members, signalling a more confrontational approach that seeks to deter collective action outside US-led frameworks.
Washington’s critical response to South Africa’s G20 leadership, coupled with its broader reassessment of engagement with multilateral institutions and more adversarial posture towards BRICS, illustrates growing constraints on policy independence.
In this environment, India’s leadership of BRICS assumes particular significance for South Africa. India’s own commitment to strategic autonomy and multi-alignment positions it as a moderating force within the bloc—one that is inclined toward institutional reform rather than ideological confrontation. Under India’s chairmanship, BRICS is more likely to function as a platform for negotiated autonomy than as a vehicle for opposition to the West. This creates space for Pretoria to balance relations with major powers while preserving strategic autonomy across competing alignments.
At the same time, BRICS is not without its constraints. The bloc’s recent expansion has introduced a more diverse set of political priorities and economic structures, complicating consensus-building and raising questions about institutional coherence. These internal pressures coincide with a US foreign policy that places greater emphasis on bilateral leverage over multilateral engagement, heightening risks for middle powers such as South Africa. However, these dynamics have also reinforced the rationale for collective engagement. A more transactional external environment strengthens incentives for BRICS members to preserve a forum that enables coordination, hedging, and political cover.
This logic resonates with South African policy debates, including recent commentary from domestic think tanks such as the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), which have emphasised the need to diversify partnerships without becoming entangled in great-power rivalry. BRICS’ original objective of advocating greater representation for emerging economies in global institutions, through reform of bodies such as the UN Security Council and the Bretton Woods institutions, aligns closely with South Africa’s long-standing diplomatic priorities. India’s stewardship offers continuity at a moment when both expansion-related complexity and a more challenging external environment threaten to test the bloc’s cohesion.
Under India’s chairmanship, BRICS is more likely to function as a platform for negotiated autonomy than as a vehicle for opposition to the West. This creates space for Pretoria to balance relations with major powers while preserving strategic autonomy across competing alignments.
Consolidating G20 Gains
South Africa’s G20 presidency demonstrated how a middle power from the Global South can shape global norms despite limited material leverage. By elevating African development priorities, debt vulnerabilities, and climate finance needs into mainstream global discourse, Pretoria generated significant normative capital. The challenge now is ensuring that these gains do not dissipate as attention shifts to other global priorities.
India’s BRICS presidency offers a platform to consolidate and extend this agenda. BRICS, in contrast to the G20, is explicitly oriented towards the concerns of emerging markets and developing economies, providing a complementary arena in which African priorities can be institutionalised. South Africa can leverage the BRICS platform to sustain momentum on issues such as reform of multilateral development banks, innovative financing mechanisms, and enhanced African representation in global economic governance.
The convergence between BRICS, the G20, and Brazil’s hosting of COP30 in 2025 further strengthens this opportunity. India has signalled its intention to explore synergies between these processes, particularly in areas such as climate finance and the governance of artificial intelligence. This convergence offers South Africa, a longstanding proponent of just and accessible climate finance, a pathway to embed African concerns within emerging governance frameworks.
South Africa as a Bridge-Builder in the BRICS Framework
BRICS remains one of South Africa’s most important diplomatic arenas, both as a platform for Global South coordination and as a means of amplifying African agency. India’s chairmanship provides an opportunity for Pretoria to work with a like-minded partner to refocus BRICS on development, practical cooperation, and institutional credibility, areas where South Africa’s diplomacy has traditionally been strongest.
South Africa can leverage the BRICS platform to sustain momentum on issues such as reform of multilateral development banks, innovative financing mechanisms, and enhanced African representation in global economic governance.
This aligns with President Cyril Ramaphosa’s articulation of South Africa as a bridge-builder: a state capable of mediating between regions, interests, and ideological divides. It also resonates with growing calls for South Africa to use BRICS more strategically to advance African industrialisation, energy transitions, and technological competitiveness, rather than treating membership as symbolic.
The broader continental context reinforces this imperative. Africa’s demographic expansion, growing economic potential, and increasing geopolitical visibility have made it a focal point of global competition. Meanwhile, the second Trump administration’s retrenchment from Africa has created strategic vacuums. In this environment, BRICS offers South Africa a space to consolidate African interests and project continental priorities on its own terms.
Defining Africa-Centric Objectives in BRICS
To maximise the opportunity presented by India’s chairmanship, South Africa should focus on several credible, deliverable priorities that align with both countries’ interests.
First, reform of the global financial architecture should remain central. India’s support for International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota reform, the expansion of the New Development Bank, and initiatives such as the proposed BRICS Multilateral Guarantee Initiative align closely with South Africa’s advocacy for fairer access to development finance. These efforts complement African calls for debt relief and improved creditworthiness.
Second, artificial intelligence, digital public infrastructure, and skills development offer a promising avenue for cooperation. India’s experience with digital public infrastructure provides a practical model for inclusive development, and initiatives such as the proposed G20–Africa Skills Multiplier could help address Africa’s demographic and employment challenges through knowledge transfer rather than dependency.
India’s support for International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota reform, the expansion of the New Development Bank, and initiatives such as the proposed BRICS Multilateral Guarantee Initiative align closely with South Africa’s advocacy for fairer access to development finance.
Third, climate finance and preparedness must remain a priority. Building on Brazil’s COP30 agenda, South Africa can collaborate with India to advance just transition financing, technology transfer, and climate resilience frameworks that reflect Global South realities.
Assessing the Strategic Utility of BRICS for South Africa
India’s 2026 BRICS presidency does not guarantee South Africa influence. It does, however, offer a rare alignment of leadership, timing, and institutional opportunity. In a world where traditional governance structures are losing legitimacy and geopolitical competition is intensifying, the question is not whether BRICS will remake the global order, but whether states like South Africa can use it effectively.
For Pretoria, this will require strategy rather than rhetorical ambition. By leveraging India’s pragmatic leadership, consolidating gains from its G20 presidency, and championing focused priorities within BRICS, South Africa can enhance its resilience, protect its strategic autonomy, and reinforce its role as a credible leader in the Global South.
As global power continues to diffuse, Africa’s task is not to choose sides but to shape the terms of engagement. Whether South Africa seizes that opportunity under India’s BRICS chairmanship will be a defining test of its foreign policy maturity.
Aaliyah Vayez is an independent IR analyst specialising in African foreign policy and BRICS.
US Power: From Covert Influence to Overt Compulsion (Власть США: от тайного влияния к открытому принуждению) / South Africa, January, 2026
Keywords: brics+, expert_opinion, political_issues
2026-01-17
2026-01-17
South Africa
Source: iol.co.za
For decades, United States power projection operated largely in the shadows. Regime change, political interference and economic pressure were often denied, outsourced or obscured behind the language of democracy promotion and national security. What is unfolding today, particularly under Donald J. Trump’s renewed influence on global politics, marks a decisive shift: from covert intervention to overt compulsion.
This transition is reshaping global alignments, hardening resistance among Global South states, and accelerating the very multipolar order Washington claims to fear.
A History of Quiet Hands and Loud Consequences
US political interference abroad is not new. During the Cold War, covert operations were central to American foreign policy, especially where governments or liberation movements threatened to align with socialist or non-aligned blocs.
In Africa, the overthrow and assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the first democratically elected leader of the Congo, remains one of the most notorious examples. Lumumba’s perceived proximity to the Soviet Union triggered US-backed efforts to remove him, culminating in his replacement by Mobutu Sese Seko, a dictator whose rule devastated the country for decades but remained firmly aligned with Western interests.
Latin America tells a similar story. In Brazil, allegations of CIA engagement with opposition forces during political instability preceded the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and the imprisonment of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, clearing the path for Jair Bolsonaro, an openly authoritarian figure, to assume power. The irony was stark: authoritarianism was tolerated, even enabled, so long as it aligned with US strategic preferences.
In each case, the justification was familiar: democracy, stability, freedom. Yet the outcomes repeatedly undermined all three.
Trump and the End of Plausible Deniability
Donald Trump represents a break from this tradition of quiet interference. His approach is blunt, transactional and unapologetically unilateral. To his supporters, this is refreshing honesty. To much of the world, it is destabilising.
Trump has demonstrated an ability to implement his worldview decisively. He reduced NATO troop deployments in Germany, imposed sweeping tariffs, particularly targeting BRICS-aligned economies, and reframed alliances as commercial arrangements rather than shared security commitments. Domestically, his decision to pardon January 6 rioters signalled a selective interpretation of law and accountability.
Internationally, his rhetoric has been even more disruptive. From threatening Mexico with punitive measures to openly stating US interest in acquiring Greenland, a territory linked to a NATO ally, Trump has blurred the line between strategic negotiation and neo-imperial assertion.
Venezuela: Sovereignty Redefined by Force
The reported CIA operation to forcibly detain President Nicolás Maduro marked a dramatic escalation. Whatever one’s view of Maduro’s leadership, often described as authoritarian and repressive, the operation raised profound questions about sovereignty, international law and precedent.
What happened was not a multilateral intervention, nor a UN-sanctioned action. It was unilateral force exercised against a sovereign head of state.
Why Venezuela? The answer is not complicated. The country holds some of the world’s largest oil and gold reserves and sits within close geographic proximity to the United States. Strategic interest, not moral outrage, explains the urgency.
The broader signal was unmistakable. Latin America was reminded that defiance carries consequences. So were other regions watching closely.
The deeper question, however, remains unresolved: who sets the global standard for authoritarianism and human rights, particularly when the self-appointed arbiter routinely falls short of those same principles?
South Africa and the Meaning of Choice
Against this backdrop, South Africa’s decision to host joint naval exercises with Russia, China, Iran, and other observing BRICS+ states, takes on far greater significance.
The drills, explicitly framed as maritime security and economic protection exercises, were conducted openly and without apology. This was not covert alignment. It was deliberate, sovereign choice.
For Washington, the optics were uncomfortable. South Africa has already faced criticism for its role in BRICS, its ties with Russia and Iran, and its legal action against Israel at the International Court of Justice. Hosting military drills with US rivals was read as defiance.
From Pretoria’s perspective, however, the logic was consistent. South Africa has long argued that its foreign policy is non-aligned, multilateral and rooted in international law. Participation in BRICS cooperation frameworks reflects that position, not hostility towards the West.
A World on Edge
Globally, tensions are escalating. The war in Ukraine remains unresolved, increasingly framed as a long-term attritional conflict between NATO and Russia rather than a regional war. The Middle East is under strain, East Asia remains volatile, and economic fragmentation is accelerating through sanctions, tariffs and competing financial systems.
In this environment, US unilateralism is no longer producing compliance, it is producing resistance.
BRICS’ repeated commitments to multilateralism, UN-authorised processes and opposition to unilateral sanctions reflect a growing consensus among non-Western states: global governance cannot be dictated by one power, especially when that power increasingly disregards the rules it once championed.
From Fear to Friction
The transition from covert interference to overt compulsion marks a strategic shift by the United States. Fear can compel obedience in the short term, but it also hardens opposition and legitimises alternative power centres.
South Africa’s naval drills, Venezuela’s defiance and BRICS’ expansion all point to the same reality: the era of quiet compliance is ending.
The question now is not whether the world is becoming multipolar, it already is. The real question is whether global powers can navigate this transition through law, dialogue and cooperation, or whether overt force will continue, accelerating instability for all.
Source: iol.co.za
For decades, United States power projection operated largely in the shadows. Regime change, political interference and economic pressure were often denied, outsourced or obscured behind the language of democracy promotion and national security. What is unfolding today, particularly under Donald J. Trump’s renewed influence on global politics, marks a decisive shift: from covert intervention to overt compulsion.
This transition is reshaping global alignments, hardening resistance among Global South states, and accelerating the very multipolar order Washington claims to fear.
A History of Quiet Hands and Loud Consequences
US political interference abroad is not new. During the Cold War, covert operations were central to American foreign policy, especially where governments or liberation movements threatened to align with socialist or non-aligned blocs.
In Africa, the overthrow and assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the first democratically elected leader of the Congo, remains one of the most notorious examples. Lumumba’s perceived proximity to the Soviet Union triggered US-backed efforts to remove him, culminating in his replacement by Mobutu Sese Seko, a dictator whose rule devastated the country for decades but remained firmly aligned with Western interests.
Latin America tells a similar story. In Brazil, allegations of CIA engagement with opposition forces during political instability preceded the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and the imprisonment of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, clearing the path for Jair Bolsonaro, an openly authoritarian figure, to assume power. The irony was stark: authoritarianism was tolerated, even enabled, so long as it aligned with US strategic preferences.
In each case, the justification was familiar: democracy, stability, freedom. Yet the outcomes repeatedly undermined all three.
Trump and the End of Plausible Deniability
Donald Trump represents a break from this tradition of quiet interference. His approach is blunt, transactional and unapologetically unilateral. To his supporters, this is refreshing honesty. To much of the world, it is destabilising.
Trump has demonstrated an ability to implement his worldview decisively. He reduced NATO troop deployments in Germany, imposed sweeping tariffs, particularly targeting BRICS-aligned economies, and reframed alliances as commercial arrangements rather than shared security commitments. Domestically, his decision to pardon January 6 rioters signalled a selective interpretation of law and accountability.
Internationally, his rhetoric has been even more disruptive. From threatening Mexico with punitive measures to openly stating US interest in acquiring Greenland, a territory linked to a NATO ally, Trump has blurred the line between strategic negotiation and neo-imperial assertion.
Venezuela: Sovereignty Redefined by Force
The reported CIA operation to forcibly detain President Nicolás Maduro marked a dramatic escalation. Whatever one’s view of Maduro’s leadership, often described as authoritarian and repressive, the operation raised profound questions about sovereignty, international law and precedent.
What happened was not a multilateral intervention, nor a UN-sanctioned action. It was unilateral force exercised against a sovereign head of state.
Why Venezuela? The answer is not complicated. The country holds some of the world’s largest oil and gold reserves and sits within close geographic proximity to the United States. Strategic interest, not moral outrage, explains the urgency.
The broader signal was unmistakable. Latin America was reminded that defiance carries consequences. So were other regions watching closely.
The deeper question, however, remains unresolved: who sets the global standard for authoritarianism and human rights, particularly when the self-appointed arbiter routinely falls short of those same principles?
South Africa and the Meaning of Choice
Against this backdrop, South Africa’s decision to host joint naval exercises with Russia, China, Iran, and other observing BRICS+ states, takes on far greater significance.
The drills, explicitly framed as maritime security and economic protection exercises, were conducted openly and without apology. This was not covert alignment. It was deliberate, sovereign choice.
For Washington, the optics were uncomfortable. South Africa has already faced criticism for its role in BRICS, its ties with Russia and Iran, and its legal action against Israel at the International Court of Justice. Hosting military drills with US rivals was read as defiance.
From Pretoria’s perspective, however, the logic was consistent. South Africa has long argued that its foreign policy is non-aligned, multilateral and rooted in international law. Participation in BRICS cooperation frameworks reflects that position, not hostility towards the West.
A World on Edge
Globally, tensions are escalating. The war in Ukraine remains unresolved, increasingly framed as a long-term attritional conflict between NATO and Russia rather than a regional war. The Middle East is under strain, East Asia remains volatile, and economic fragmentation is accelerating through sanctions, tariffs and competing financial systems.
In this environment, US unilateralism is no longer producing compliance, it is producing resistance.
BRICS’ repeated commitments to multilateralism, UN-authorised processes and opposition to unilateral sanctions reflect a growing consensus among non-Western states: global governance cannot be dictated by one power, especially when that power increasingly disregards the rules it once championed.
From Fear to Friction
The transition from covert interference to overt compulsion marks a strategic shift by the United States. Fear can compel obedience in the short term, but it also hardens opposition and legitimises alternative power centres.
South Africa’s naval drills, Venezuela’s defiance and BRICS’ expansion all point to the same reality: the era of quiet compliance is ending.
The question now is not whether the world is becoming multipolar, it already is. The real question is whether global powers can navigate this transition through law, dialogue and cooperation, or whether overt force will continue, accelerating instability for all.
BRICS+ Series: Iran’s Perpetual Uncertainty and the Limits of Prediction (Серия статей BRICS+: Постоянная неопределенность в Иране и пределы прогнозирования) / South Africa, January, 2026
Keywords: Iran, political_issues
2026-01-15
2026-01-15
South Africa
Source: iol.co.za
Trying to forecast Iran’s political trajectory has been something thats tempted analysts into false certainty for a very long time. The country resists linear prediction not because it lacks patterns, but because its moments of rupture rarely announce themselves clearly in advance. Iran’s political history shows that crises often unfold slowly, unevenly, and beneath the surface of apparent continuity. This remains true today, even as global observers attempt to interpret protests, regional escalation, and elite manoeuvring as signals of imminent transformation.
Iran’s modern political order was forged through upheaval. The revolution that toppled the monarchy was not experienced by contemporaries as an inevitable outcome, but as a prolonged period of instability marked by contradictory forces, incomplete information, and rapidly shifting loyalties. At the time, economic breakdown, social mobilisation, and state violence were visible, yet their ultimate convergence into a new political system was far from obvious. That ambiguity is instructive when assessing Iran’s present moment.
Managed Instability at Home
Today’s Iran exists under conditions both familiar and fundamentally altered. Economically, the country remains constrained by sanctions that have hollowed out state capacity and reduced living standards. Energy wealth continues to coexist with domestic scarcity, a paradox that fuels popular resentment. Periodic protests, sparked by economic hardship, political repression, or social grievances reveal a society under strain. Yet unrest alone does not equate to regime collapse. The state retains coercive capacity, institutional coherence, and a security apparatus deeply embedded in political life.
What complicates analysis is the nature of Iran’s political equilibrium. Rather than stability or imminent breakdown, the system operates in a state of managed instability. Protest is tolerated up to a point, repression is calibrated rather than absolute, and concessions are selective. This allows the regime to absorb pressure without fundamentally altering its power structure. At the same time, opposition forces remain fragmented. While dissatisfaction is widespread, it has not yet coalesced into a unified political project capable of challenging the state from within.
The digital age has intensified this ambiguity. Images of protest and repression circulate instantly, creating the impression of unprecedented transparency. Yet this abundance of information often obscures more than it clarifies. Leadership structures within opposition movements remain unclear, while elite decision-making processes are deliberately opaque. Despite constant updates, external observers still struggle to distinguish between episodic unrest and structural rupture.
What most sharply distinguishes the current period from earlier moments of crisis is Iran’s geopolitical positioning. Unlike the late 1970s, Iran is no longer a peripheral actor aligned with Western interests, but a central node in multiple regional and global fault lines. Its strategic relationships with Russia and China, its role in regional proxy networks, and its direct confrontation with Israel and the United States embed domestic politics within a far broader geopolitical calculus.
Recent escalations between Iran and Israel illustrate this dynamic. Limited strikes, shadow warfare, and carefully calibrated retaliation reflect a shared interest in avoiding full-scale war, yet they also heighten the risk of miscalculation. For Tehran, projecting strength abroad is not simply foreign policy posturing; it functions as a mechanism of internal legitimacy. Regional influence has become intertwined with regime survival, reinforcing the state’s resistance to both domestic reform and external pressure.
This entanglement poses challenges for Western policy. Framing Iran as perpetually on the brink of collapse may be politically convenient, but it encourages reactive strategies focused on containment rather than long-term engagement. Sanctions and isolation have weakened Iran economically, but they have not produced the political outcomes many anticipated. Instead, they have reinforced the regime’s security logic and deepened its reliance on non-Western partnerships.
Iran today is neither stable nor on the verge of imminent transformation. It exists in a condition of prolonged tension, where unresolved social, economic, and political pressures accumulate without producing decisive change. History suggests that when transformation does come, it will likely appear sudden only in hindsight. For now, humility remains the most valuable analytical tool. Iran’s future will not be shaped by prediction alone, but by the unpredictable interaction of domestic endurance and geopolitical confrontation forces that continue to resist simple narratives.
Source: iol.co.za
Trying to forecast Iran’s political trajectory has been something thats tempted analysts into false certainty for a very long time. The country resists linear prediction not because it lacks patterns, but because its moments of rupture rarely announce themselves clearly in advance. Iran’s political history shows that crises often unfold slowly, unevenly, and beneath the surface of apparent continuity. This remains true today, even as global observers attempt to interpret protests, regional escalation, and elite manoeuvring as signals of imminent transformation.
Iran’s modern political order was forged through upheaval. The revolution that toppled the monarchy was not experienced by contemporaries as an inevitable outcome, but as a prolonged period of instability marked by contradictory forces, incomplete information, and rapidly shifting loyalties. At the time, economic breakdown, social mobilisation, and state violence were visible, yet their ultimate convergence into a new political system was far from obvious. That ambiguity is instructive when assessing Iran’s present moment.
Managed Instability at Home
Today’s Iran exists under conditions both familiar and fundamentally altered. Economically, the country remains constrained by sanctions that have hollowed out state capacity and reduced living standards. Energy wealth continues to coexist with domestic scarcity, a paradox that fuels popular resentment. Periodic protests, sparked by economic hardship, political repression, or social grievances reveal a society under strain. Yet unrest alone does not equate to regime collapse. The state retains coercive capacity, institutional coherence, and a security apparatus deeply embedded in political life.
What complicates analysis is the nature of Iran’s political equilibrium. Rather than stability or imminent breakdown, the system operates in a state of managed instability. Protest is tolerated up to a point, repression is calibrated rather than absolute, and concessions are selective. This allows the regime to absorb pressure without fundamentally altering its power structure. At the same time, opposition forces remain fragmented. While dissatisfaction is widespread, it has not yet coalesced into a unified political project capable of challenging the state from within.
The digital age has intensified this ambiguity. Images of protest and repression circulate instantly, creating the impression of unprecedented transparency. Yet this abundance of information often obscures more than it clarifies. Leadership structures within opposition movements remain unclear, while elite decision-making processes are deliberately opaque. Despite constant updates, external observers still struggle to distinguish between episodic unrest and structural rupture.
What most sharply distinguishes the current period from earlier moments of crisis is Iran’s geopolitical positioning. Unlike the late 1970s, Iran is no longer a peripheral actor aligned with Western interests, but a central node in multiple regional and global fault lines. Its strategic relationships with Russia and China, its role in regional proxy networks, and its direct confrontation with Israel and the United States embed domestic politics within a far broader geopolitical calculus.
Recent escalations between Iran and Israel illustrate this dynamic. Limited strikes, shadow warfare, and carefully calibrated retaliation reflect a shared interest in avoiding full-scale war, yet they also heighten the risk of miscalculation. For Tehran, projecting strength abroad is not simply foreign policy posturing; it functions as a mechanism of internal legitimacy. Regional influence has become intertwined with regime survival, reinforcing the state’s resistance to both domestic reform and external pressure.
This entanglement poses challenges for Western policy. Framing Iran as perpetually on the brink of collapse may be politically convenient, but it encourages reactive strategies focused on containment rather than long-term engagement. Sanctions and isolation have weakened Iran economically, but they have not produced the political outcomes many anticipated. Instead, they have reinforced the regime’s security logic and deepened its reliance on non-Western partnerships.
Iran today is neither stable nor on the verge of imminent transformation. It exists in a condition of prolonged tension, where unresolved social, economic, and political pressures accumulate without producing decisive change. History suggests that when transformation does come, it will likely appear sudden only in hindsight. For now, humility remains the most valuable analytical tool. Iran’s future will not be shaped by prediction alone, but by the unpredictable interaction of domestic endurance and geopolitical confrontation forces that continue to resist simple narratives.
Investment and Finance
Investment and finance in BRICS
BRICS 2026: Navigating Challenges and Opportunities for Global Cooperation (БРИКС 2026: Преодоление вызовов и использование возможностей для глобального сотрудничества) / South Africa, January, 2026
Keywords: brics+, expert_opinion
2026-01-18
2026-01-18
South Africa
Source: iol.co.za
Ashraf Patel
Trump's shock and awe goes rogue in 2026. The attacks in Venezuela, strikes at ISIS in Nigeria, ICE attacks on US citizens in Minnesota, and a slew of Trump tariffs and visa blocks to many nations are the opening salvos of Trump 2.0 in the second year of his second term in this most disruptive moment in the post-WW2 era.
The entire foundations of the post-WW2 world order and UN institutions are caught unprepared. BRICS nations enter 2026 facing volatile degrees of headwinds, wars, and rapid erosion. The US defunding of UN entities last week adds a layer of shock to the global system. Ironically, Trump is bringing his largest delegation to the World Economic Forum WEF in Davos at the time of its deepest cuts to the UN, suggesting a global deregulation agenda. Trump, the anti-Globalist? Not so, more the global opportunist.
India will chair BRICS in 2026 at a particularly volatile time. The graceful “Namaste” gesture captures India’s timeless spirit of warmth, respect, and harmonious collaboration. It's 2026 theme "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability".
BRICS in 2026 faces a vast array of challenges to the global order.
Trump Tariffs and WTO Reform
The Trump tariffs' iron fist position pushes for largely unequal trade deals with India, Kenya, South Africa, and AGOA Africa. US tariffs on Indian goods total 50 percent, including a 25 percent reciprocal tariff announced on April 2, and an additional 25 percent secondary tariff linked to India’s continued oil trade with Russia.
Trade negotiations between the nations have been strained since the US imposed 50% tariffs on Indian goods - the highest in Asia - in August. Washington has pushed for greater access to India's agricultural sector, a long-standing sticking point which Delhi has strongly resisted. Agriculture is the heart of India, and the cowboy gunslinger approach to Indian agriculture markets is deeply concerning.
The WTO needs serious reform. As BRICS and G77 nations face multitudes of Trump tariffs and EU trade barriers, there is a need for substantive reform of the WTO. Here, BRICS in 2026 can co-create a facility for the Global South nations' trade fund to buffer against tariff wars. The WTO Investment and Agriculture agreements need agreed solutions as the WTO prepares for an all-important ministerial in Cameroon in March 2026.
UN Funding Cuts
US cuts to UN budgets are cynical as well as opportunistic. US wars and militarism are mushrooming, creating refugees and immigration. war and trade wars that are undermining national economies, causing more people to immigrate at great risk. Yet the US is cutting funding to the UN, USAID, et al that support refugees.
Here, the BRICS nations, together with the EU and Gulf and Nordic states, would have to shoulder a heavier burden and fund UN entities that are doing important work relating to the SDG agenda. BRICS nations need to be bold in plugging the gaps and recommitments to the UN Charter and core support of UN entities dealing with the SDG agenda. BRICS nations can lead by implementing the UN Pact for the Future at the national and regional levels.
COP 30 commitments
BRICS offers an opportunity to refocus on climate change and mobilise resources for climate finance, especially for Africa and the majority world. The BRICS New Development Bank NDB can expand funding and climate finance capital, and BRICS platforms can accelerate climate technologies for nations in the G77 and Global South.
BRICS nations need to meet their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in line with the core COP agreements as agreed in Belem, Brazil. The BRICS Green Industrialization programs are relevant for the Global South, coupled with innovation as a key theme in 2026, offer major opportunities for BRICS plus nations and a viable model of balanced industrialisation. The BRICS core can provide nations with more climate resilience technologies and capacity.
Securing Peace and Development
The ever-increasing mushrooming of ‘never-ending wars’ is a hallmark of US foreign policy. Trump's war-peace playbook is exposed and is rooted in encouraging wars so the US alone can sell ‘evermore arms’ to nations at war.
For Africa, the mushrooming of conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Northern Mozambique, and the West African – Sahel belt continues amidst climate change and less funding for UN peacekeeping.
In South East Asia, several mushrooming conflicts and hotspots simmer. From the Indian- Pakistan border wars, to the Bangladesh and Myanmar political turmoil, to the Thai-Cambodia border conflicts, the need for security and peace is paramount.
Here, the BRICS nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) offer a long-standing format of stability and certainty in India's BRICS year.
In the past decade, India was being co-opted by Washington as an ally in Asia and the Pacific. Trump's raw and rogue approach is rapidly upending this narrative. From trade wars to lopsided regional partnerships to UN funding cuts to WTO chaos, these issues are causing deep consternation in New Delhi. This trend is set to be a key feature of Trump 2.0.
Hence, BRICS and G77 offer the best hope for the Global South and the North to save the international order, secure the UN SDGs, and ensure core multilateral institutions broaden their mandate and serve a development agenda.
BRICS 2026 offers host India and BRICS Plus a window, or an opportunity to deepen a global agenda rooted in the UN Charter and the Pact for the Future, and ensure multilateralism through a fair and equitable world order for the benefit of the Global South and the most vulnerable.
Will India step up to this bold task in 2026?
* Ashraf Patel is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Global Dialogue, UNISA.
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.
Source: iol.co.za
Ashraf Patel
Trump's shock and awe goes rogue in 2026. The attacks in Venezuela, strikes at ISIS in Nigeria, ICE attacks on US citizens in Minnesota, and a slew of Trump tariffs and visa blocks to many nations are the opening salvos of Trump 2.0 in the second year of his second term in this most disruptive moment in the post-WW2 era.
The entire foundations of the post-WW2 world order and UN institutions are caught unprepared. BRICS nations enter 2026 facing volatile degrees of headwinds, wars, and rapid erosion. The US defunding of UN entities last week adds a layer of shock to the global system. Ironically, Trump is bringing his largest delegation to the World Economic Forum WEF in Davos at the time of its deepest cuts to the UN, suggesting a global deregulation agenda. Trump, the anti-Globalist? Not so, more the global opportunist.
India will chair BRICS in 2026 at a particularly volatile time. The graceful “Namaste” gesture captures India’s timeless spirit of warmth, respect, and harmonious collaboration. It's 2026 theme "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability".
BRICS in 2026 faces a vast array of challenges to the global order.
Trump Tariffs and WTO Reform
The Trump tariffs' iron fist position pushes for largely unequal trade deals with India, Kenya, South Africa, and AGOA Africa. US tariffs on Indian goods total 50 percent, including a 25 percent reciprocal tariff announced on April 2, and an additional 25 percent secondary tariff linked to India’s continued oil trade with Russia.
Trade negotiations between the nations have been strained since the US imposed 50% tariffs on Indian goods - the highest in Asia - in August. Washington has pushed for greater access to India's agricultural sector, a long-standing sticking point which Delhi has strongly resisted. Agriculture is the heart of India, and the cowboy gunslinger approach to Indian agriculture markets is deeply concerning.
The WTO needs serious reform. As BRICS and G77 nations face multitudes of Trump tariffs and EU trade barriers, there is a need for substantive reform of the WTO. Here, BRICS in 2026 can co-create a facility for the Global South nations' trade fund to buffer against tariff wars. The WTO Investment and Agriculture agreements need agreed solutions as the WTO prepares for an all-important ministerial in Cameroon in March 2026.
UN Funding Cuts
US cuts to UN budgets are cynical as well as opportunistic. US wars and militarism are mushrooming, creating refugees and immigration. war and trade wars that are undermining national economies, causing more people to immigrate at great risk. Yet the US is cutting funding to the UN, USAID, et al that support refugees.
Here, the BRICS nations, together with the EU and Gulf and Nordic states, would have to shoulder a heavier burden and fund UN entities that are doing important work relating to the SDG agenda. BRICS nations need to be bold in plugging the gaps and recommitments to the UN Charter and core support of UN entities dealing with the SDG agenda. BRICS nations can lead by implementing the UN Pact for the Future at the national and regional levels.
COP 30 commitments
BRICS offers an opportunity to refocus on climate change and mobilise resources for climate finance, especially for Africa and the majority world. The BRICS New Development Bank NDB can expand funding and climate finance capital, and BRICS platforms can accelerate climate technologies for nations in the G77 and Global South.
BRICS nations need to meet their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in line with the core COP agreements as agreed in Belem, Brazil. The BRICS Green Industrialization programs are relevant for the Global South, coupled with innovation as a key theme in 2026, offer major opportunities for BRICS plus nations and a viable model of balanced industrialisation. The BRICS core can provide nations with more climate resilience technologies and capacity.
Securing Peace and Development
The ever-increasing mushrooming of ‘never-ending wars’ is a hallmark of US foreign policy. Trump's war-peace playbook is exposed and is rooted in encouraging wars so the US alone can sell ‘evermore arms’ to nations at war.
For Africa, the mushrooming of conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Northern Mozambique, and the West African – Sahel belt continues amidst climate change and less funding for UN peacekeeping.
In South East Asia, several mushrooming conflicts and hotspots simmer. From the Indian- Pakistan border wars, to the Bangladesh and Myanmar political turmoil, to the Thai-Cambodia border conflicts, the need for security and peace is paramount.
Here, the BRICS nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) offer a long-standing format of stability and certainty in India's BRICS year.
In the past decade, India was being co-opted by Washington as an ally in Asia and the Pacific. Trump's raw and rogue approach is rapidly upending this narrative. From trade wars to lopsided regional partnerships to UN funding cuts to WTO chaos, these issues are causing deep consternation in New Delhi. This trend is set to be a key feature of Trump 2.0.
Hence, BRICS and G77 offer the best hope for the Global South and the North to save the international order, secure the UN SDGs, and ensure core multilateral institutions broaden their mandate and serve a development agenda.
BRICS 2026 offers host India and BRICS Plus a window, or an opportunity to deepen a global agenda rooted in the UN Charter and the Pact for the Future, and ensure multilateralism through a fair and equitable world order for the benefit of the Global South and the most vulnerable.
Will India step up to this bold task in 2026?
* Ashraf Patel is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Global Dialogue, UNISA.
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.
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